Remembering Writer Robert Ludlum

DATE March 13, 2001 ACCOUNT NUMBER N/A
TIME 12:00 Noon-1:00 PM AUDIENCE N/A
NETWORK NPR
PROGRAM Fresh Air

Interview: Professor Avi Shlaim talks about his historical studies
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
TERRY GROSS, host:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

When it comes to the faltering Middle East peace process, you may feel like
you've heard all the arguments on both sides. But there are several
historians who have been rewriting the history of the Israelis and the
Palestinians with the help of new source material they've gained access to.
And these new histories challenge some of the cherished orthodoxies on each
sides.

My guest, Avi Shlaim, is one of the leading revisionist historians. He is a
professor of international relations at Oxford University and author of the
book "The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World," which has been published in
paperback. Before we get to his research into the past, let's start with the
present. I asked him what he thinks of the prospects for peace with age-old
adversaries like Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat in power.

Professor AVI SHLAIM (International Relations, Oxford University): Given that
the two leaders are now Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat, the odds on peace must
be very, very remote. On the other hand, it's worth remembering that Yasser
Arafat signed the Oslo Accord with Yitzhak Rabin seven years ago and sealed it
with a historic handshake in the White House and that he remains committed to
a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Israel.

On the Israeli side, we have Ariel Sharon whose record has been one of
consistent opposition to many of Israel's earlier peace efforts like the peace
with Egypt. So his record doesn't lead to any optimism. On the other hand,
the political situation forces Ariel Sharon to try and resume the peace
process. That's one point. Secondly, public opinion is strongly in favor of
continuing the search for a final settlement with the Palestinians. And
finally, Ariel Sharon is 72 years old, he must be concerned with his place in
history and he must want very badly to succeed as Israel's prime minister.
And the only way to succeed and go down in history as a peacemaker would be
to achieve a final settlement with Yasser Arafat.

GROSS: I'm wondering if you've, in any way, given up on this generation of
Israeli and Palestinian leaders and if you're any more optimistic about the
generation that will replace them?

Prof. SHLAIM: It's very difficult to work up any enthusiasm for this
generation of Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Yasser Arafat has been there
for so long, he doesn't have very much credibility. The record of his police
forces and security forces on freedom of expression isn't at all a good one,
abuses by the Palestinian Authority and police of human rights. So he's not a
very attractive leader for the Palestinian movement.

On the other hand, number two, the recent and obvious successor, and when
Yasser Arafat leaves the scene, then there will probably be a power struggle,
mainly between the security chiefs. So I wouldn't be too optimistic that the
next generation of Palestinian leaders is going to be of the kind that
Americans and Europeans and democrats of any country are going to be able to
be very happy about or very enthusiastic about.

On the Israeli side, it's very difficult to predict what would come after
Ariel Sharon. After all, five months ago, Ariel Sharon was a very marginal
figure in Israeli politics. He was almost unelectable because of his
reputation for brutality, because of his indirect responsibility for the
massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatilla in 1982. And
yet he won the last election by a huge margin over Ehud Barak. So we might
see a new kind of Ariel Sharon; Ariel Sharon, mark two, who would be very
different to the previous Ariel Sharon, with whom we are familiar. What will
come after Ariel Sharon is, at the moment, impossible to predict.

GROSS: President Bush has thrown out Clinton's peace plan. And President
Bush clearly doesn't plan on taking as active a role in the peace process.
What impact do you think this will have on the peace process in the Middle
East?

Prof. SHLAIM: It's extremely unfortunate that President Bush has turned his
back on Bill Clinton's peace plan. Bill Clinton had pursued an Israel-first
policy, which made him suspicious as an honest broker for the Arabs. On the
other hand, very much in Bill Clinton's favor, he was completely engaged in
the peace process and spared no time and effort to achieve a break in this
conflict on the Palestinian track. His new proposal went a long way towards
meeting the essential Palestinian demands for a settlement. They offered the
Palestinians an independent state on roughly 95 percent of the West Bank and
Gaza with a capital in East Jerusalem.

And quite a lot of progress was made between the Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators just before the Israeli election, and just before the Israeli
election, Barak suspended the negotiations. So I'm very disappointed that
President Bush had said that Clinton's proposals were his proposals and they
left office with him and that they do not commit the new administration. I'm
disappointed because they were very good proposals, and because President
Bush also has departed from the commitment and engagement in the peace process
to a hands-off position of leaving it to the parties to try and work out a
settlement between themselves.

After all, ever since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, America has been
the manager of the Arab-Israeli peace process. And without an active role,
it's difficult to see how the two sides would be able to reach a final
solution.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Avi Shlaim. He's a professor
of international relations at Oxford University and author of the book, "The
Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World," which has just been published in
paperback.

Both Israel and the Palestinians base their cases on their interpretation of
ancient and contemporary history. And, of course, they come up with
completely different interpretations. What is your role as a historian in
this context?

Prof. SHLAIM: My role as a historian is to give an honest account of the
historical roots of this conflict. The historical roots go back a very long
way, that we don't need to go back to biblical times or look at the ideologies
of the two sides. It is enough to start in 1948 and the establishment of the
state of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war. And to give an account of the
conflict, which is based on a fair and objective understanding of the roots of
this conflict in 1948.

My role as a historian is to look at the claims of both sides, to look at
notions, however cherished by both sides, subject them to critical scrutiny in
the light of the official documents that are now available and discard any
notions, any ideas, any claims that don't stand up to historical scrutiny.

GROSS: Let's take a cherished claim from each side and see what you have to
say about it. Why don't you start with an Israeli claim that you feel you can
dispute through your research into history?

Prof. SHLAIM: OK. One Israeli claim is that the military balance in 1948
overwhelmingly favored the Arab side. Israelis often use the mantra, `Maeti
mour rubin,' `The few against the many.' They portray the 1948 war as a
desperate struggle by a tiny Jewish community against overwhelming numbers and
arms of the entire Arab world. My research and the research of my fellow
Israeli revisionist historian shows that in 1948, the Jewish forces
outnumbered all the Arab forces, regular and irregular, operating in the
Palestine theater. And that after the first truth, they also outgunned them
as well as a result of illicit arms and imports from the Eastern bloc. So the
picture of a tiny Jewish David fighting against the strong and overbearing
Arab Goliath is simply a myth. In this war, as in all other wars, the
stronger side won. And the establishment of the state of Israel and the
Israeli victory in 1948 is not a miracle.

GROSS: Well, maybe you can explain a little bit more how Israelis outnumbered
the Arab forces when there were several Arab armies participating in the war
and Israel was, comparatively, very small.

Prof. SHLAIM: It's very easy to explain that because I'm only talking about
the balance of forces, the numbers of troops in the Palestine theater, not in
the entire Middle East. You're quite right. There were five regular Arab
armies involved in the invasion of Palestine--Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon
and Iraq all sent armies. But they were expeditionary armies. They were in
the bulk--the bulk of the forces stayed back home. Then there was the Arab
Liberation Army which was an irregular army funded and organized by the Arab
League. And there were a few other smaller groups of volunteers like the
Muslim Brothers(ph) who came from Egypt. But if you add up all the Arab
troops in Palestine, they come to between 21 and 25,000 soldiers; whereas the
Israeli side, on the 15th of May, 1948, had 35,000 soldiers. So the numerical
balance was in favor of little Israel.

GROSS: Let's take a cherished idea from the Palestinian point of view and put
that to the test of your historical research.

Prof. SHLAIM: Fine. One major Palestinian myth or cherished notion is that
they were simply the victims of the power struggle in Palestine and that
everybody conspired against them. The United Nations passed a partition
resolution in November, 1947, which called for creating two independent states
in Palestine, one Jewish, one Arab. The Jews accepted the partition
resolution, the Palestinians rejected it. So they themselves rejected the
main proposal for a solution and they must assume their share of the
responsibility that a peaceful solution did not come about and that, instead,
a war was forced on Israel and Israel won this war. So the responsibility for
the consequent refugee problem, the three-quarter of a million Palestinians
who lost their homes and became refugees, that responsibility must, in part,
be assumed by the Palestinian leadership at that time.

GROSS: Avi Shlaim is my guest. He's a professor of international relations
at Oxford University and the author of the new book "The Iron Wall: Israel
and the Arab World." Let's take a short break here and then we'll talk some
more. This is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: My guest is Avi Shlaim. He's a professor of international relations
at Oxford University and author of the new book "The Iron Wall: Israel and
the Arab World."

When you talk about revisionist history, the kind of history that you're
writing, what's responsible for the revisionism? Is it just the point of view
of the historians, such as yourself, who are writing it? Or are there new
sources, new information that's available now that is enabling you to rethink
Israel's recent history?

Prof. SHLAIM: The two main factors that help to explain the emergence of the
revisionist or new Israeli history: One is the availability of new sources.
Here it has to be said, to Israel's credit, that it has a very liberal policy
in opening up its archives to critical scrutiny and thereby making possible
critical books. Israel copied the British 30-Year Rule(ph), which governs the
review and declassification of official documents. So under the 30-Year Rule,
we have a great deal of new sources that were not available before. And I
have to say, in fairness, that not a single Arab country has a policy of
opening up its records to independent scholars. So we have an asymmetry in
the sources available. We have British, American, UN and Israeli sources in
abundance. But we have only very limited access to Arab primary sources on
1948.

That's one point. The second point is the change in the political climate in
Israel following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. There was a broad
consensus, until that time, until 1982, in Israel that all of Israel's wars
were defensive wars. The Lebanon war was an offensive war by Israel. And
there was a lot of dissent while the war was in progress. This had never
happened before. After the war, there was a real debate on whether Israel is
indeed simply the victim and simply the defensive party, or whether it has a
much greater responsibility for the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
And this debate and criticism of the establishment created a space in which
the message of the new historians began to have much more favorable reception
than earlier criticisms of the establishment had done.

GROSS: Now you had said that one of the reasons why you and your fellow
revisionist historians can rethink the history of the Middle East is that
Israel has a 30-year law. After 30 years, secret archival information is
opened up to researchers. Can you give us an example of something that you
learned from documents that were released only recently that caused you to
rethink an aspect of Middle East history?

Prof. SHLAIM: Yes, I can. I can think of many examples, but let me take
just one issue. Why was there no peace in the Middle East in 1949 after the
guns fell silent, after the ending of military hostilities? The traditional
Israeli explanation could be summed up in two words: Arab intransigence.
Israel's leaders wanted peace with their neighbors with all their hearts and
all their might, but there was no one to talk to on the Arab side.

I worked in the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem and I found that the files
of the Israeli Foreign Ministry for late 1948 and 1949 are bursting at the
seams with evidence of Arab peace-feelers. The first peace-feeler came from
King Farook of Egypt. Then there was the long-standing friendship in
cooperation with King Abdullah of Transjordan. And immediately, the war
ended, he renewed the contact with his Jewish friends and these negotiations
between Israel and Transjordan continued, literally, until the day of
Abdullah's death in 1951.

And, in many ways, the most interesting example that I came across is that of
Colonel Hosni Sieem(ph) of Syria, who carried out a coup in 1949 in March.
And he wanted a full peace settlement with Israel, with the immediate exchange
of ambassadors, normal economic, calm relations, everything that Israel had
been asking for all along. But he also had his price. He wanted territorial
concessions from Israel.

My conclusion is that it simply is not true that there was no one to talk to
on the Arab side. The Arab public was hostile to Israel but the Arab rulers
were very pragmatic and very willing to engage in negotiations about a
settlement.

GROSS: Avi Shlaim is a professor of international relations at Oxford
University. His latest book, "The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World," is
now out in paperback. He'll be back in the second half of the show. I'm
Terry Gross and this is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music; credits)

GROSS: Coming up, historian Avi Shlaim tells us what he was taught about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict when he was growing up in Israel. And we
remember best-selling espionage writer Robert Ludlum. He died yesterday at
the age of 73.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross, back with Avi Shlaim. He
describes himself as a revisionist historian of the Middle East, challenging
cherished claims on each side of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. His
latest book has been published in paperback. It's called "The Iron Wall:
Israel and the Arab World." Shlaim is a professor of international relations
at Oxford University. His revisionist history is largely based on Israeli
documents that have been recently released.

Now you say that you wish you had access to Palestinian documents, but there
isn't that kind of access available. What questions would you most like to
resolve?

Prof. SHLAIM: The central Israeli claim about the Arab side in 1948 is that
all the Arabs who participated in the '48 war, who participated in the
invasion, were united by two aims: One was strangling at birth the infant
Jewish state; and, two, throwing the Jews into the sea. And I would like
access to the official Arab records in order to see what the true motives
were, the true assumptions and calculations and aims were because, on the
basis on the existing Arab sources at my disposal, the picture that I have of
the Arab coalition facing Israel in 1948, is that it was one of the most
deeply divided, disorganized and ramshackled coalitions in the history of
warfare and, indeed, that it was the inability of the Arab states to
coordinate the military and diplomatic strategy, which in large measure was
responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed them.

I already have a great deal of evidence to show that the Arabs were divided
among themselves; the different countries had different war aims. But I would
like to have more, really, first-rate evidence on this issue.

GROSS: Tell us more about what you think those divisions were about and what
the differing war aims were.

Prof. SHLAIM: The Arab states were loosely organized within the Arab League,
but within the Arab League, there were different groups. King Abdullah had
reached a tacit agreement with the Jewish agency about the partition of
Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians. He wanted to gain control over
the Arab part of Palestine, over what we call today the West Bank and, after
the dust had settled, to live in peace with the new Jewish state.

So a Jewish state was part of his scenario, part of his plan, for the
settlement after the war in the Middle East, whereas King Farouk was worried
about the prospect of the territorial expansion of King Abdullah and the
growth in his power and influence and, therefore, he wanted to curtail
Transjordanian territorial expansion. So these two countries were at
loggerheads.

Similarly, King Abdullah was very ambitious, and he had a project of Great
Assyria(ph), which would have included Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon. And he
wanted, of course, to be the ruler of Greater Transjordan. So Syria and
Lebanon regarded King Abdullah as a threat to their own independence, and they
were reluctant to cooperate with him.

The result was that there was very little operational cooperation or planning
or coordination between the individual Arab armies operating in the Palestine
theater. And this lack of cooperation, lack of unity, was a major factor in
the Arab defeat in that war.

GROSS: One of the subjects that you've investigated historically is the
expulsion of Palestinians from Israel in 1948. And I'm wondering what things
you've come to challenge in the way Israelis and Palestinians describe their
parts in that history.

Prof. SHLAIM: The real expert on the Palestinian refugee problem is Benny
Morris. He wrote a classic book, "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee
Problem, 1947-1949." His conclusion is that there were many different factors
that accounted for the Palestinian exodus. But the single most important
factor was the Israeli actions in 1948, and that, of course, contradicts the
traditionally Israeli version that Israel called upon the Palestinians to stay
and assured them that they would not be harmed. And it was their own leaders
who asked them to retreat, to withdraw, with the promises that they would
return in the wake of the victorious Arab armies. So Benny Morris' research
discredits the traditional Israeli version of how the Palestinian refugee
problem was created. And all that I have read on this subject supports the
conclusions of Benny Morris.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Avi Shlaim, who describes
himself as a revisionist historian of Israel and the Arab world. And his new
book is called "The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World." He's a professor
of international relations at Oxford University.

Avi Shlaim, you're Jewish. I'm wondering if you ever lived in Israel.

Prof. SHLAIM: Yes, I did. I lived in Iraq as well. I was born to a Jewish
family in Baghdad in 1945, and in 1950, my family moved to Israel as part of
the Iraqi-Jewish exodus in that year. I grew up in Israel. I went to school
in Israel. I did national service in Israel. But I had all my university
education in Britain, and I've only taught in British universities. I have
never taught in Israeli universities.

GROSS: Do you still have family in Israel?

Prof. SHLAIM: I still have family in Israel. My mother lives there and a
sister. And I have many, many friends in Israel.

GROSS: Growing up in Israel, you must have grown up with a certain point of
view about Israeli history. I'm wondering if there's any one aspect of
Israeli history that you learned that you always believed was just a fact
about Israeli history that you've since come to challenge, something that you
haven't yet mentioned.

Prof. SHLAIM: That's an interesting question. I was a schoolboy in Israel,
and I was taught at school the traditional Zionist version of the conflict
with the Arab world. And specifically about 1948, I was taught at school the
heroic version of the few against the many and, also, the view that Israel
held to much higher moral standards than its opponents, the notion of (foreign
language spoken), `the purity of arms,' that arms must be only used for
defense.

Not only was I taught all these traditional notions and the notion of Arab
intransigeance and fanatical and implacable Arab hostility towards Israel, I
believed them and never questioned them for one moment, until much later in
life. I started doing research in the archives and discovered a very
different, a much more nuanced and complex picture.

Some of my Israeli critics think that I am selective in my approach, and I am
particularly happy when I come across a piece of evidence which shows Israel
in a dark light. This isn't so. I don't have any prejudice against Israel,
nor am I looking for evidence to discredit Israel. I've never, ever
questioned Israel's legitimacy. I don't think that some of the Israeli
actions in 1948, like expelling Palestinians, call into question the
legitimacy of the state of Israel. My job as a historian is to look
objectively at the evidence and to reach my own conclusions.

GROSS: My guest is historian Avi Shlaim. His latest book is called "The Iron
Wall: Israel and the Arab World." We'll talk more after a break. This is
FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: My guest, Avi Shlaim, describes himself as a revisionist historian of
the Middle East. His latest book is called "The Iron Wall: Israel and the
Arab World." He's a professor of international relations at Oxford
University.

The title of your book, "The Iron Wall," comes from something that was written
in 1923 by Zeev Jabotinsky, who you describe as the founder of revisionist
Zionism and the spiritual father of the Israeli right. What did he write in
1923 about the iron wall? What was his concept?

Prof. SHLAIM: Zeev Jabotinsky, in this article "The Iron Wall" in 1923, said
that a voluntary agreement between the Jews and the Arabs is not possible.
The Palestinians were not a rebel, but a nation. And no nation in history had
ever voluntarily made way for another nation. So there was no way that the
Palestinians would agree willingly to share their land with a Jewish state.
There was no way that they would agree to an independent Jewish state in their
midst.

It followed from this analysis: that the only way to achieve the Zionist aim
of an independent Jewish state in Palestine was unilaterally and by force.
What Jabotinsky suggested is that it would be necessary to create an iron wall
of Jewish military strength, and the Arabs would bash their heads against this
iron wall, they would try and obliterate the Jewish community, and they will
try and fail repeatedly until they give up any hope of eliminating Israel from
the map.

But the important point about Jabotinsky is that he also had a theory of
change. He didn't advocated accumulating military force forever. His main
point was the need to negotiate with the Arabs from a position of unassailable
strength. Once that point had been achieved, he wanted Israel's leaders to
proceed to stage two, which was negotiations with the Palestinians about the
rights and status in Palestine.

GROSS: And one of your points is that you think the Israeli right today has
adapted the iron wall as a permanent way of life, as opposed to one stage and
the process toward peace.

Prof. SHLAIM: My account suggests that the history of Israel is a vindication
of the strategy of the iron wall, but you have to move to stage two. The
first Israeli leader to transcend the iron wall was Yitzhak Rabin in signing
the Oslo accord with the Palestinians. But his right-wing successors,
Benjamin Netanyahu, tried to put the clock back and to return to the iron
wall and not to go forward on the political front with the Palestinians.
That's, in a nutshell, my criticism of the Israeli right.

GROSS: You grew up in Israel, but you live and teach in England. And I'm
wondering what aspect of the British involvement in the Israeli story you find
most interesting and that information that you're challenging?

Prof. SHLAIM: The most interesting aspect, as far as British involvement in
Palestine is concerned, is: What was Britain's aim in the twilight of the
mandate over Palestine between November 1947, when the UN passed the partition
resolution, and the proclamation of the state of Israel on the 15th of May,
1948? This is one of the main bones of contention in the debate between the
old and the new historians. The old Zionist historians claim that Britain
never accepted the partition of Palestine, never accept a Jewish state, but,
on the contrary, encouraged and armed her Arab allies and particularly King
Abdullah of Transjordan to invade Palestine and to destroy the infant Jewish
state at birth.

My own research and the research of Elam Parte(ph) points in a different
direction. It suggests that Britain pragmatically accepted the inevitability
of a Jewish state, but was determined to prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian state, because the Palestinian leader was the grand mufti, Haj
Amin al-Husseini, who was a renegade who had thrown his lot in with Nazi
Germany during the Second World War. So in British eyes, a Palestinian state
was synonymous with a mufti state. And hostility to the mufti and to the idea
of an independent Palestinian state was a permanent and important feature of
British policy during that period.

So if there is a case against Britain, the case is not that it tried to
prevent the establishment of a Jewish state, but rather that it tried and
succeeded in aborting the birth of a Palestinian state.

GROSS: My experience is that Jewish-Americans are often very emotionally
involved with the story of Israel and feel very strongly politically in
whichever point of view that they have. I'm wondering if there's an
equivalent in England; if Israel is such an emotional issue for Jewish people
living in England.

Prof. SHLAIM: No, there is a real contrast between the American Jewish
community and the British Jewish community in relation to Israel. The British
Jewish community is very low key and doesn't stand up and defend Israel in the
way that American Jews have a tendency to do.

GROSS: Why do you think that's true?

Prof. SHLAIM: The British Jewish community is much more concerned with
internal issues of the community in Britain and the status of the community in
Britain and ethnic relations, relations with Muslims and Christians, inside
Britain than they are in issues relating to foreign policy and to the peace
process.

There isn't an intense debate about Israel within the Jewish community in
Britain as far as I am aware. The real contrast is between Israel and
America. In my experience, Israel is a much more liberal and open society,
much more open to criticism than America. America is a democracy, and there
is freedom of speech on all issues, but when it comes to Israel, then there is
a real inhibition about standing up and criticizing Israel openly.

And in my experience, the greatest resistance that I have encountered to my
views was when I spent a year doing research in Washington, DC, in the early
1980s. There was strong resistance to airing different views about Israel,
and argument and debate were not encouraged. And it would be good if American
Jews copied the Israeli example of greater openness in debating historical
issues.

GROSS: Avi Shlaim, thank you very much for talking with us.

Prof. SHLAIM: Thank you very much. It's been a real pleasure.

GROSS: Avi Shlaim is a professor of international relations at Oxford
University. His latest book, "The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World," is
now out in paperback.

Coming up, we listen back to an interview with best-selling spy novelist
Robert Ludlum. He died yesterday. This is FRESH AIR.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Interview: Remembering the career of writer Robert Ludlum, who
died yesterday
TERRY GROSS, host:

Robert Ludlum, the best-selling espionage novelist, died yesterday at the age
of 73. Conspiracies, secret governments, terrorists and spies were the stuff
of his novels. He liked to keep his readers in suspense. Book critic John
Leonard once wrote, `Ludlum tells a story like a man who must get it done
before the house burns down around us. I sprain my wrist turning his pages.'

Ludlum's novels include "The Borne Identity," "The Parsifal Mosaic," "The
Holcraft Covenant" and "The Icarus Agenda." I spoke with Robert Ludlum in
1988.

(Soundbite from 1988 interview)

GROSS: Now, you know, there's American and British traditions of espionage
writing. Do you think there are any differences between the way Americans,
like yourself, and the way the British writers, like Le Carre, write about
this subject, write this genre?

Mr. ROBERT LUDLUM (Author): Oh, yeah, I think there's a difference. I think
that they can be more obviously cerebral than some of the American writers of
the genre that I have been identified with; cerebral in the sense of
introspection. I try to show introspection without really talking about it
that much, but they have their doubts. Their self-doubts are expressed more
voluminously than I do. I try to do it in quick brush strokes so that you see
the pain through the introspection, because I think if somebody is
introspective, he wouldn't be in the business he's in. And that's why I do it
my way.

GROSS: Do you have inside sources that you cultivate in the CIA or in
government who give you interesting information background?

Mr. LUDLUM: Oh, yeah. There's Daffy Duck and Bugs Bunny and...

GROSS: Yeah.

Mr. LUDLUM: No, not really. I must say that several people I went to college
with have ended up in allied intelligence circles, and they still remain great
friends of mine. I've never asked them, nor would they violate anything, but
sometimes if I'll call them up to just say, `Hey, Blank, what do you think
about so and so?' And if they laugh too hard, then I figure I'm getting near
a target, but that's about it. I know--it's mainly imagination.

GROSS: I read in one place that you ran away from home at the age of 14 to
join the Marines; you had to lie about your age and join the Marines.

Mr. LUDLUM: Yeah.

GROSS: And another place, I read that at the age of 14, you ran away to be in
the theater. I'm not sure if either of those things are true. So maybe you
can straighten that out.

Mr. LUDLUM: Well, there's a grain in truth in all of it. But, you know, it's
like today; that everybody says what a successful actor I was. Well, that is
totally nonsense. I mean, I barely survived as an actor. But it's true, I
did not run away from home; I left home. And I left home originally to go on
the stage. I was in "Junior, Miss and Janey"(ph) in the Chicago-New York
companies. And it's true that I did not join the Marines then. What I did
was I tried to enlist in the Royal Canadian Air Force, and I was using another
name. I was using the name of Holmes(ph) because I--well, anyway, I used the
name of Holmes. And I was in the recruitment center in Toronto. I left the
show and had my understudy take over. And by that time, there was word out on
me and somebody shouted out, `Ludlum?' I said, `Yes?' `No. Out.' And that
was the end of my career in the RCAF.

I did, however--the next year I went back to school. And I did, however, the
next year enlist in the Marines. I think it was on the day before my 17th
birthday or something like that. I was in prep school and I simply decided
that, you know, `Everybody else was winning the war. Why can't I?' And so I
joined the Marines at 17.

GROSS: So did you see much action?

Mr. LUDLUM: No, no, no. I don't go into that. I was in the South Pacific,
but in a very--such a minor way compared to other people. I don't even--you
know, don't go into it. It's silly.

GROSS: Well, you mentioned before that you started your career as an actor.
And I must say, you really have a terrific voice.

Mr. LUDLUM: Thank you.

GROSS: What kind of roles did you play when you were acting?

Mr. LUDLUM: I either played homicidal killers or lawyers. And I've always
thought there was a very definite connection. I was the guy that sent Siobhan
McKenna to the stake in "Saint Joan," and he was a lawyer, of course. And
then the next show I did on television--I can't even remember the name of the
show now, but I think I was considered schizophrenic, paranoid, dangerous.
And I'm not sure I was electrocuted, but I certainly should have been. I
think both for the acting and the role. But nevertheless, it was...

GROSS: Now you did commercial voiceovers for a while, too, right?

Mr. LUDLUM: Yeah, I know. It's morally one step below theft. But when you
have a couple of kids in college, it doesn't hurt.

GROSS: What kind of commercials did you do the voicing for?

Mr. LUDLUM: Well, let's see. You know, there's so many that you do and
there's so many that you try out for, you're never quite sure. I do know that
I was the voice for Braniff Airlines. You remember, `You'll like flying
Braniff style'? And then, of course, there was the one years ago--I think I
did it. I'm not sure, but `Should a gentleman offer a lady a Tiparillo?' And
then, of course, there was the--`Plunge works fast,' but let's not go into
that.

But no, no. It was thanks to a lovely agent. You know, people who kept
saying to me when I was an actor, `Boy, you'd make a terrific producer.' And I
got the message, you know, `Get off the stage.' And so I did and became a
producer. But when I did make the switch to--and when I decided I really
wanted to spend full time as a writer, to which my wife, who's a superb
actress, thought she--one, she immediately thought she'd have to go back to
work. She said, `Well, you're 40 years of age, Robert. And you might as well
try it now no matter how impoverished we may be.' But I did have the
voiceovers going, and I'm eternally grateful for it.

GROSS: So when you dropped acting at age 40, what made you think you could
actually write?

Mr. LUDLUM: Well, I'd been writing. I'd been a closet writer for years.
When I was coming back from the South Pacific, I wrote a book that I'm afraid,
on discharge, myself and several friends overimbibed at the Top Of The Mark in
San Francisco. And I lost, like, an 800-page manuscript. And to this day I
say to people--they say, `My God, you really lost a manuscript like that
size?' And I always say, `Yeah. You never remembered "Naked and the Dead"?'
I don't think Norman really appreciates that story, but it's true.

GROSS: Why did you want to write international thrillers? Why did you start
with that genre?

Mr. LUDLUM: I didn't really start thinking I'm going to do that. And to
this day, I don't really--I don't label myself. I think I write
suspense-fiction, but then, you know, so's "The Iliad" and "The Odyssey." I
write--I think it probably comes from the theater, suspense. If you're
not--you know, in the theater, if you don't want to know what happens in Act 2
after Act 1, your play's going to close, and you're going to be on the
unemployment line next Monday. And my unemployment number was 1344. I'll
never forget it. So I think that idea of suspense comes from a theatrical
background, from theatrical experience.

GROSS: Well, speaking of your theatrical experience, were you able to use
acting in character developments since you knew about what it meant to get
inside a character and how a character needed to be developed?

Mr. LUDLUM: Yeah, I think so. I don't think so particularly, you know,
consciously. I think that's just part of where I come from; that, you know,
if you're going to try to get inside the head of somebody, you--I suppose you
act it out in your imagination. I mean, I don't go around shouting Arabic, or
something like that, or Hebrew when I'm trying to describe something in the
Middle East. But, yeah, you try to get in the heads of people and you try to
use the only tool you've got, which is imagination.

GROSS: Novelist Robert Ludlum recorded in 1988. He died yesterday at the age
of 73.

(Credits)

GROSS: I'm Terry Gross.
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