Journalist James Bennet of 'The New York Times'

DATE July 8, 2003 ACCOUNT NUMBER N/A
TIME 12:00 Noon-1:00 PM AUDIENCE N/A
NETWORK NPR
PROGRAM Fresh Air

Interview: James Bennet discusses the latest developments in the
Middle East
TERRY GROSS, host:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

My guest James Bennet is the Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York Times.
He's joined us several times to talk about the latest developments in the
Middle East. We invited him to discuss the cease-fire that was declared a
week ago Sunday by the three major Palestinian groups: Hamas, Islamic Jihad
and Fatah. But by the time we recorded our interview early this morning, the
cease-fire had been broken by a suicide bomber who attacked an Israeli home
last night on the West Bank, killing an Israeli women and injuring three of
her grandchildren. A cell of Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, but the
leadership of the group disavowed the attack and said they're still committed
to a suspension of violence.

I asked James Bennet how much control the leadership has over would-be
suicide bombers.

Mr. JAMES BENNET (The New York Times Jerusalem Bureau Chief): Well, it's
interesting. Palestinian and Israeli security officials both say that Hamas
and Islamic Jihad have a very high degree of discipline inside the
organizations. They're very hierarchical organizations. And as recently as
Sunday, senior Israeli security officials were saying that they expected Hamas
and Islamic Jihad were more likely to abide by this temporary cease-fire than
Fatah, whose Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades organization is somewhat more chaotic,
has less direct command and control. So it raises the question as to whether
this group that conducted this attack last night was, in fact, operating
autonomously, whether there's some double game being played here, whether
Islamic Jihad itself ordered this attack, now wants to be seen as disavowing
it and suggesting that it was conducted by a renegade group, or whether they,
in fact, don't have the degree of discipline that Israel itself credits them
with.

GROSS: So how so far is this affecting the peace talks?

Mr. BENNET: Well, it's interesting. The Israeli response so far has been
fairly muted to this attack. Israel's position all along has been that this
cease-fire was nothing but a ploy, an effort to blunt Israel's army, to
restrict its military operations, and give these groups time to rearm and
regroup. They've been under substantial pressure for some time from Israel
now. So Israel didn't put much official stock in this cease-fire to begin
with.

On the other hand, in the area where this occurred, which is in central
Israel, along the boundary with the northern West Bank, in that area Israel
has not yet withdrawn from the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and retains
effective security control, so the Palestinian security forces have not yet
taken over there. And while the cease-fire was intended to apply to all
attacks against Israel everywhere, according to these groups, the Palestinian
security weren't in a position there yet, according to both sides, to really
maintain control.

GROSS: So the Palestinian security can't be blamed for the attack.

Mr. BENNET: Well, they can still be blamed, and Israel is saying this is
evidence that they need to take aggressive steps to break apart these groups
and take the weapons away from them. Israel is by no means suggesting that it
bears any responsibility for what happened last night. But it makes it a
little harder to draw a direct line, I think, between Palestinian security
failure and this particular attack.

GROSS: Another issue that's threatening the forward motion of the peace talks
is the issue of the release of Palestinian prisoners that the Israelis are
holding. The Palestinian leadership wants thousands of Palestinian prisoners
released by the Israelis. The Israelis have agreed to release several hundred
Palestinian prisoners. Why is this such a contentious issue?

Mr. BENNET: Well, it's a deeply emotional issue for both sides in the
conflict. For Israelis, these prisoners are terrorists; some, as the Israelis
say--or many with blood on their hands, directly implicated in attacks on
Israelis. For Palestinians, many of these same people are freedom fighters;
some of them, they believe, are not implicated in any attack and were simply
arrested to create a concession for Israel down the road--that is, their
release. So the Palestinians feel that they can't leave these people behind,
in essence. The Israelis feel like they can't safely let them go. Both
populations are very, very engaged in this issue. It's not an issue
necessarily at the leadership level alone. It's really something that brings
the publics out into the streets on both sides.

It was an issue, by the way, that dogged the Oslo peace process, as well. And
it's interesting. It's not even in--it's not reflected explicitly in the new
peace plan, the so-called road map. It wasn't something that the negotiators
even dealt with. So it's something that the two sides are coming to grips
with on their own, and it's becoming the most significant obstacle at the
moment to moving this peace plan forward.

GROSS: How important is the issue of Palestinian prisoners to the new
Palestinian prime minister, who was one of the leading figures in the
negotiations on the road map? Is he willing to risk stopping the peace talks
over this issue?

Mr. BENNET: Well, it's interesting. It's become important to him, I think.
And today, startlingly really, he has canceled or at least postponed talks
that were planned for tomorrow with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, and
the reason he's put forward is this issue of Palestinian prisoners. He had
two very difficult meetings last night--one within his own faction, Fatah; the
other within the broader umbrella Palestine Liberation Organization with
several Palestinian factions--in which he was harshly criticized for moving
forward with this peace plan without having secured more concessions from
Israel specifically on prisoners.

Israel said on Sunday that it was going to release about 300, 350 more
prisoners, but they fairly narrowly define the population they're ruling to
release favoring people under 18, people over 60, women. The Palestinians
want to see many of the long-term prisoners released, including many of the
people that Israel says are directly involved in terrorist attacks.

GROSS: So the next road map meeting has been canceled. Is everything off
right now? Or is this just like one meeting's canceled?

Mr. BENNET: We've seen a fair amount of forward motion in the last few days,
including meetings at lower levels between Israeli and Palestinian ministers.
We're suddenly seeing a broadening out of the contacts between the two sides.
The details of this plan are starting to be filled in by the two sides. That
was happening as recently as yesterday. Last night there was the suicide
attack. Today the slightly paradoxical result is that the Israeli response to
the attack is, so far at least, rather muted. But now the Palestinians are
the ones canceling talks, attributing it, again, to this prisoner issue.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is James Bennet. He's the
Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York Times.

Well, it's been over a week since the three main Palestinian groups, Fatah,
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, agreed to suspend attacks on Israelis. And you wrote
last week that you thought the agreement was based on bad faith, and that
ironically that bad faith may actually give it a chance of success. What did
you mean by the bad faith?

Mr. BENNET: Well, all these groups are going into this suspension of
violence, this declared cease-fire, with, I think, very different interests
that reflect the kind of complexity of politics on the Palestinian side, these
interests and differences of goals that were, in effect, muted by the
conflict. Everybody agreed they were fighting alongside each other against
Israel for 33 months. As that conflict perhaps comes to a close, these
differences are starting to become apparent once again.

Fatah, the mainstream faction, officially is seeking a two-state solution with
Israel. Islamic Jihad and Hamas remain officially committed to the
destruction of the state of Israel. Mahmoud Abbas, who is the new Palestinian
prime minister, has gone far further than the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat
ever did in declaring an end to violence that he seeks unequivocally an end to
the armed uprising against Israel. This is arguably not remotely in the
interests of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, who don't want to see any kind of
negotiated solution and have rejected the idea of negotiations. The question
is: Why would they come to this agreement now?

Abu Mazen, or Mahmoud Abbas, has made no secret of his desire to turn these
Islamic groups, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, into political parties inside
Palestinian society, preventing them from conducting essentially their own
foreign policies towards Israel. So his goal is to get this cease-fire, use
it to extract some political concessions from Israel, use those, in turn, to
bolster his own popularity, which remains very limited, among Palestinians and
then be in a stronger position to enforce the cease-fire and achieve the goals
he wants.

I think that Hamas and Islamic Jihad are betting in the other direction, that
the cease-fire will fail. They don't want to be seen as responsible for it,
because Palestinians really would like to see some progress, I think, don't
necessarily share the goals of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and those groups don't
want to be seen directly as blowing apart any possibility for agreement. On
the other hand, they would like to be able to have Israel be seen as the
villain here, have this negotiation collapse and see Abu Mazen collapse along
with it.

GROSS: Why does the Palestinian prime minister want Hamas and Islamic Jihad
to become political parties?

Mr. BENNET: He's trying to avoid a direct confrontation with those groups,
partly because he feels he lacks the strength to have it; partly because he
doesn't think that it would be supported in the Palestinian street, which
posits national unity as the overarching goal. Nobody on that side wants to
see a direct conflict, a civil conflict of some sort among Palestinians. So
he wants to have their willing cooperation in this cease-fire. For the
moment, he's achieved it, thanks to some intervention by more popular leaders
within his own faction, Fatah.

GROSS: Are Islamic Jihad and Hamas political parties already, or at least,
you know, in part political parties? And does Mahmoud Abbas want them to just
give up terrorism and violence? Or does he want them to really become like a
more formal part of the political process?

Mr. BENNET: No. And that's a very important point, they are not political
parties now, and that they do not compete within the Palestinian Authority for
seats in the Palestinian parliament. They don't compete for the presidency of
the Palestinian Authority or the prime ministership, because they regard the
PA, the Palestinian Authority, as a creature of the Oslo peace process. They
oppose the Oslo peace process essentially as a sellout of Palestinian
aspirations and interests. Because they oppose that process, they've always
refused to participate, although they've expressed some interest in competing
at the local level where, not coincidentally, they're particularly strong,
running for mayoral offices, city councils, things like that. And there was
some talk of them beginning to participate in parliamentary elections as well.
He wants to see them fully participate, fully engage, as political parties,
and to a certain degree he's asking them to put up or shut up.

They keep claiming they have so much popularity in the street. The reality is
they do have a good deal of popularity, which stems from their networks of
health clinics, schools, which are extremely inexpensive, and also the
reputation for incorruptibility. Hamas leaders, unlike PA leaders, are not
seen as corrupt. They live relatively simply. They tend to live in refugee
camps and live among the people, where even Mahmoud Abbas and his minister of
security, Mohammed Dahlan, both have mansions in the Gaza Strip, in Gaza
City, which is a small place and people know where they live. The Hamas
leaders are still scattered among the population, and as a result they're
regarded as more devoted in that sense to the people's interests.

GROSS: What do you think Israel would think of Hamas and Islamic Jihad
becoming more a part of the political process?

Mr. BENNET: Well, it depends, I guess, on whether in the end Mahmoud Abbas'
second element in that strategy was successful; that is, his hope, I think, of
pulling their fangs; that is, getting them to join in the political process
and essentially lay their weapons down. Israel doesn't think that's going to
happen because to do that would be essentially for these groups to give up
their very reason for existing, which is a notion of establishing some sort of
Islamic state in all of historical Palestine and putting an end to the state
of Israel. The Israeli security establishment, in any event, doesn't believe
that they're willing to take that step.

But again, we don't know how dynamic this process is. We don't know whether
if this peace plan moves forward if life really improves for Palestinians if
the Palestinian Authority is able to reform itself substantially, present
itself as not corrupt, as interested and successful in promoting the welfare
of its people, whether support for these other groups will essentially dry up,
which is what Mahmoud Abbas is betting.

GROSS: How are Hamas and Islamic Jihad affected by the war in Iraq? Has that
changed their status in any way?

Mr. BENNET: Oh, definitely. I mean, that's had a major impact on the
conflict here. There's been a direct hit to some of their financing which
came from Iraq, but also the American presence in the region, the new pressure
that it's putting directly now on Syria and Iran, sponsors of Hamas, also on
Saudi Arabia; very importantly on Saudi Arabia, has had an effect on reining
in Hamas. And it's interesting that the external leadership of the group in
Damascus, particularly Halad Mishal, who's a top leader based there of Hamas,
was very involved in negotiating this cease-fire agreement.

GROSS: My guest is James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York
Times. We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau
chief for The New York Times. He's speaking to us from Jerusalem.

Let's talk a little bit about Fatah, the more mainstream Palestinian group
that was founded by Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, the new Palestinian prime
minister. What are some of the things they stand to gain or lose in the road
map process?

Mr. BENNET: From the outside, this conflict has looked like a sort of
continuum, at least on the Palestinian side, of suicidal attacks and different
forms of terrorist violence, attacks on soldiers. And, in fact, within
Palestinian society there are gradations and shadings that sometimes aren't
evident on the outside. Fatah, whose leadership officially favors a two-state
solution with Israel, has been divided internally over the course of the
conflict over what sorts of violence the faction should embrace; that is,
whether it should confine its attacks only to the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
which Israel occupied during the 1967 Six Day War, or whether it should
conduct attacks in what is known as pre-1948 Israel. The argument was that by
focusing only on the occupied territories on soldiers and settlers there, they
would make clear that their goal was only to achieve a state in those
territories and to end the occupation.

What happened over the course of the conflict was that Fatah increasingly
became embroiled, not just in the conflict with Israel, but in a sort of
tit-for-tat competition with Hamas to see which group could conduct the most
sensational attacks. Beginning in January really of 2002, Fatah began
conducting attacks across the so-called Green Line, which is this 1967
boundary. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is a violent offshoot of Fatah,
began conducting suicide attacks as well, which used to be the province only
of the really Islamist groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. So in a sense the
violence of these groups became indistinguishable, and to Israelis this seemed
that Fatah was now bent on the same goal as the other groups, which was the
extermination of Israel itself.

At the same time during this period, a rising generation of Fatah leaders was
growing increasingly concerned that they'd essentially lost control of the
faction's message and its youth, that this Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was a
chaotic organization made up of some ideologues, some true believers, some
ex-car thieves, conducting a kind of anarchic war against Israel, and they
began looking for a way to rein them in and to clarify what the faction's
goals were. I think Mahmoud Abbas is now essentially at the spearhead of that
effort, to try to, once again, refine, if you will, Fatah's message and to try
to re-engage--this is a very important part of his strategy--to try to
re-engage the Israeli center, to reassure Israeli leftists and moderates that,
in fact, there are Palestinians that are willing or have accepted the idea of
a two-state solution.

GROSS: Well, what could Mahmoud Abbas do to try to rein in the Al Aqsa
Brigades, the Martyrs Brigades?

Mr. BENNET: It's something of an open question how much control the
leadership of Fatah has over the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Mahmoud Abbas
himself has almost none. Yasser Arafat has far more influence as the symbol
and the guy who, at least for most of the conflict, controlled most of the
money going to those groups. That doesn't mean even, Israeli security
officials say, that he could simply turn it off, and they've anticipated that
despite the truce agreement the Al Aqsa Martyrs will continue to conduct the
attacks, as indeed they have, particularly in the northern West Bank--sniper
attacks on roads in the West Bank and things like that.

So what he's done is turn to some other influential leaders within Fatah, in
particular Marwan Barghouti, who was jailed by Israel more than a year ago,
and is a young and fairly popular leader within the faction, who was very
involved in negotiating the truce agreement and, in effect, lent his
imprimatur to it. That's had something of an effect on these groups, I think.

GROSS: Yeah. Marwan Barghouti has been in an Israeli prison for over a year.
The Israelis allowed him to participate in peace talks recently. Were you
surprised that the Israelis let him do that?

Mr. BENNET: It is interesting. I mean, the contacts were made through his
lawyers, who have the right to visit him, and were shuffling messages back and
forth, but there were other contacts that the people who were involved,
Barghouti's emissaries, did not want to describe that, I think, required some
Israeli cooperation. Essentially he dispatched two emissaries to Damascus to
meet with the leadership there of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and it was that
group that really hammered out this truce agreement in the end. Mahmoud Abbas
was not entirely happy with it in the end, I think, partly because Barghouti
got so much of the credit for it.

So it's interesting that at this kind of critical moment, Israel, which
remained officially very much opposed to this cease-fire, was nevertheless
willing to use Marwan Barghouti, or at least permit him to be used, to achieve
it.

GROSS: James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York Times, speaking
to us from a studio in Jerusalem. Our interview was recorded earlier today.
We'll hear more of it in the second half of the show.

I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

(Announcements)

GROSS: Coming up, the new role of the Bush administration in the Middle East
peace process. We continue our interview with James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau
chief for The New York Times. And Ken Tucker continues his series on the
latest in pop rock. He reviews "Redhead" by the musician known as Bleu.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross back with more of the interview we
recorded earlier today with James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau chief for The New
York Times. He spoke to us from a studio in Jerusalem about the Middle East
peace process and the latest setbacks. When we left off, we were talking
about the new Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas. He opposes the
continuation of violence.

The statements that he's recently made include our struggle, the Palestinian
struggle, is `a political struggle which we will end through diplomatic means.
We have no hostility toward the Israeli people, and we have no interest in
continuing to struggle with you.' And then he said he `renounced terror
against the Israelis wherever they may be.' Are these new positions for him?

Mr. BENNET: He has been known to be a critic throughout the intifada, of
the armed intifada. The two have considered it to have been a disaster for
the Palestinians. He broke with Yasser Arafat over the conduct of this
conflict, but he did it very quietly. He was, in a sense, sulking in his
tent. He was in Ramallah, he was in the Gulf, he was sort of out of sight for
most of the conflict, maintaining some of his contacts with the Israeli peace
camp, continuing to go abroad and talk to diplomats overseas, but he wasn't an
active presence until he was essentially revived as this peace plan started to
come into focus into recent months. And he's stepped forward and taken these
positions publicly now, which are far ahead, I think it's safe to say, of
where most of his people are.

Last week the comments that you just quoted he made in a joint appearance with
Ariel Sharon here in Jerusalem, and the imagery of that appearance--it was as
striking, I think, as the words. Ariel Sharon was taking something of a
political risk in meeting with any Palestinian leader, of course, as well, but
Ariel Sharon remains the dominant politician now in Israel. His popularity is
quite strong. His faction is in very strong control of his government.
Abbas, on the other hand, does not have that kind of strength.

And he appeared side by side with Ariel Sharon, standing at a podium that was
decorated with a menorah, one of the symbols of the state of Israel. He
laughed at Ariel Sharon's jokes. The two men looked quite comfortable with
each other. They shook one another's hands warmly. It was a very, very
powerful imagery within Israel. Israelis were really struck by it; even some,
I think, moved by it. Palestinians, I think, were a little discomforted, some
of them, by it. And I think it was perhaps a great exercise of leadership on
his part, also maybe a great political risk. It's too soon really to judge.

But it's very interesting in light of that of how comfortable the two leaders
seem with each other a week ago that all of a sudden Prime Minister Abbas
today feels the need to cancel the meeting that was planned for tomorrow with
Ariel Sharon.

GROSS: Does Arafat himself have any real power in the current negotiations
for peace?

Mr. BENNET: Absolutely. Absolutely. Again, it's very interesting that
Israeli officials who tend--have attended for quite some time to talk about
how influential Yasser Arafat is, to talk about how involved he is in the
process and how much trouble he's causing lately have been all but silent on
the question of Yasser Arafat. There have been many fewer stories than we
usually see in the Israeli press. The issue has been somewhat soft-pedaled, I
think, because they're trying to avoid emphasizing this split between Yasser
Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas in an effort to bolster Mahmoud Abbas. They don't
want to complicate his life, I think, by suggesting that there is this
division and that they're betting on the one guy and against the other.

So they're talking less about him, but that doesn't mean he's not intimately
involved. He is. Mahmoud Abbas reports to him constantly. He still retains
effective control of at least half, I think, of the Palestinian security
forces, a leadership of the various branches. Many of those leaders still
report to him. Many of the ministers in the government that Abu Mazen,
Mahmoud Abbas, formed report, as well, to Yasser Arafat. So he's very
involved.

GROSS: You were saying that a lot of the Israeli leadership was very
skeptical of the truce that the Palestinian groups called a week ago Sunday.
The truce has been broken already, but it's still officially in effect. Ariel
Sharon has been a hard-liner throughout his political career. Why do you
think he is willing to take the risk that he has taken so far to go forward
with the road map?

Mr. BENNET: Well, the Israelis are also under significant pressure from
Washington. They were very reluctant to proceed with the road map. The
government did not want to endorse this approach. The Americans pushed and
pushed, and ultimately Israel agreed, while putting forward certain conditions
which the Americans said that they would entertain along the road.

So far at least, the road map is unfolding, at least in the short term, at
least in the steps we've seen in these early days along the lines that Israel
had demanded; that is, security remains first and foremost the issue that's
being negotiated between the two sides. The Israelis are pulling back slowly
from what, by previous agreement under the Oslo accords, were
Palestinian-controlled areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. So far the
Israelis have pulled the troops back from parts of the Gaza Strip and from
most of Bethlehem. They've yet to evacuate any of the other West Bank cities
where they've taken positions over the course of the fighting in the last
year.

And Israel is demanding that the Palestinians take the measures that Israel
has always asked for from them, which are to dismantle, as they say, the
terrorist infrastructure; in effect, drive Hamas and Islamic Jihad out of
business, close their training centers, close their bomb laboratories, arrest
their dangerous members, collect their weapons. Those are the steps they want
to see these groups take.

At the same time, Israel has made one of the concessions called for under the
plan, which is to dismantle some of these so-called settlement outposts, these
sort of hilltop groupings of trailers and tents that settlers have put up over
the course of the conflict, to extend their presence in the West Bank. Israel
has begun taking some of those down. New ones are going up almost as fast or
faster even than the old ones are coming down.

GROSS: Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, used the word `occupation'
in late May. He said, `You may not like the word, but what's happening is
occupation. Holding 3.6 million Palestinians under occupation is a bad thing
for Israel, for the Palestinians and for the Israeli economy.' What has been
the impact on Israel for Sharon to have actually used the word `occupation' to
describe the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza?

Mr. BENNET: Well, it was a really astonishing moment because his own
government, his own foreign ministry was working to change the use of the term
occupation, challenging the use of the word occupation, trying to change it to
disputed territories rather than recognizing this concept. Ariel Sharon has
not used the word since then because the backlash was so severe within his own
faction.

Essentially what Ariel Sharon legitimated not just in the eyes of Israel's
left but really in the eyes, I think, of most political analysts here was the
notion that Israel couldn't hold on to all of the West Bank and Gaza, that it
was going to have to give up some of these territories. He had talked about
territorial concession before, but he had not used this language of occupation
before, which suggested that Israel was actually doing something wrong,
morally wrong in holding on to this land.

He has spoken repeatedly, even when he hasn't talked again--he specifically
used the word `occupation.' He said it's simply not in Israel's interest to
continue to control more than three million Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza, that Israel has to address that problem and that this peace plan is a
way to do that.

And I should add, though, in doing this, Ariel Sharon, once again, positioned
himself very much in the political center in Israel. This has become--he
perhaps hardened this consensus viewpoint, but he was also joining what was
already, I think, a hardening viewpoint of the majority of Israelis about the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.

GROSS: My guest is James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York
Times. We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is James Bennet, Jerusalem bureau
chief for The New York Times.

When President Bush first came to the White House, he basically withdrew
America from the Middle East peace process, and he criticized President
Clinton for having become so personally involved in it. Now the Bush
administration is deeply involved in the Middle East peace process. What are
you hearing from the Israelis and Palestinians from the leadership on each
side behind the scenes about their perception of the Bush administration's
motives for this new involvement?

Mr. BENNET: I should say, first, that there was a real sense of surprise, I
think, here on both sides, on all sides, that the administration was engaging
as deeply as it was. The Israelis, also who had obviously much better
connections than the Bush administration--to the Bush administration going
into this process than the Palestinians did, were uncertain even on the eve of
the Iraq war as to what the end game would be, whether after Iraq the Bush
administration would, as it was then suggesting, turn its attention here or
not. They've discovered that, in fact, the Bush administration was very
serious about focusing on this problem. Both sides say the focus is quite
intense for now.

The Palestinians had essentially lost all connection with the Bush White House
over the course of the conflict, and one of Mahmoud Abbas' top goals was to
try to resume those contacts. That was why he, I think, was willing to go as
far as he was in the joint summit that took place with President Bush a month
ago in Jordan in the port city of Aqaba. He went quite far in calling for an
end to the armed uprising, using language that the Americans had demanded from
him, because he was--I think his first constituency in that summit was the
Bush White House. He really wanted to resume those ties, and the Palestinians
feel that they have now done so.

Again, they've been surprised by the level of the American involvement.
President Bush has sent a new envoy of sorts to the region. John Wolf, who is
in charge of putting a monitoring team together--he's been assembling a staff.
They've been bringing in armored cars. They're getting quite involved in the
details of putting this agreement into action.

And it's very interesting. One of the things the Palestinians really wanted
to see happen as part of the initial stages of the road map was an agreement
from Israel to stop its so-called targeted killings, its pre-emptive killings
of people it accused of being on the way to a terrorist attack or planning
such attacks. These are the helicopter missile strikes, gun attacks, other
things we've seen in the West Bank and Gaza over the last couple of years.

The agreement that's been hammered out between the two sides is that Israel
has not foresworn those sorts of attacks, but it's essentially agreed to give
the Palestinian Authority first crack. It will inform the Palestinian
Authority when it has intelligence that such an attack is under way, wait to
see of the PA acts and then it may take action itself if it doesn't.

The interesting element here is that they have also agreed to inform the
Americans, which could put the Americans in the position of essentially
green-lighting or red-lighting Israeli action, which would involve the
Americans to a degree that the Clinton administration certainly never was
involved in Middle East peacemaking here; not just Middle East peacemaking,
but Middle East violence.

GROSS: Condoleezza Rice is now President Bush's personal representative in
the Middle East. How is she regarded by both sides?

Mr. BENNET: She made her first visit here a week and a half ago as a
presidential envoy on this issue. And because she was seen as the president's
direct emissary here, both sides were very, very eager to make a good
impression. She arrived on a Saturday night, and I think it was no
coincidence that the stalemates on two fronts broke; the logjam here really
broke around the time of her visit. You saw the next day the Palestinian
factions came forward with this cease-fire announcement that they'd
essentially been negotiating for months. And at the meantime, the Israelis
and Palestinians agreed just the day before she arrived on a plan to begin
this phased withdrawal by Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank. Both these things happened, I think--both were driven forward by the
fact that she was coming and everybody wanted to make a good impression.

She wasn't regarded as necessarily as someone who was deeply versed in the
issues here, but she was seen as someone with a direct line to the president
of the United States.

GROSS: One of the rationales for the United States' invasion of Iraq was that
the United States could get rid of Saddam Hussein, help create a democracy in
Iraq and that other Arab countries would admire this new democracy and they
would want something like that for themselves and democracy would begin to
spread across the Middle East, which would be an influence for peace in the
region. Instead, right now what we're seeing in Iraq is anarchy, the
infrastructure is still destroyed, there's banditry kidnapping, sniping at the
US troops. How is this anarchic phase within Iraq affecting the Middle East
and, you know--affecting what's supposed to be like the positive bounce from
the war in Iraq?

Mr. BENNET: Well, if the chaos continues or grows in Iraq, then I think it
certainly will have an impact here. The Israelis say it will embolden Hamas
and make them feel freer to break the cease-fire again. Both sides, I think,
think it could wind up distracting the Bush administration's attention
substantially from this conflict, that they'll have other problems to solve
elsewhere, that they won't be able to continue the kind of high-level pressure
that they've put on in the last couple weeks to drive the process forward,
that they could essentially lose interest here.

You know, it's interesting, Palestinians, particularly Palestinian
intellectuals and some Palestinian politicians--and there's some overlap
between those two categories--do make this argument that Palestinian society
is particularly suited for this kind of democratic experiment, one that was
already conducted to some extent under the Oslo process, partly because the
proximity to Israel and the example of Israeli democracy--they watch Israeli
media; many Palestinians speak some Hebrew; they watch the TV; they see the
debate in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament--but also because of
Palestinians' own diaspora. Many Palestinians worked in the United States;
they worked in Western European countries. They saw what life was like there.
And they also have worked and lived in the Gulf states, and they've traveled
to Egypt and they've seen the example in the other direction of some of these
Arab governments. And they reach the conclusion that they're more interested
in the kind of democratic model that they may have seen in the United States.

GROSS: Since the truce was declared a week ago Sunday, you have been to the
West Bank; you've been to Gaza; you've been, you know, in Israel. Is travel
any different right now than it was before that cease-fire?

Mr. BENNET: It isn't different for Palestinians trying to leave those areas.
Within Gaza, Palestinians are able to move more freely now than they really
have been in the course of the 33-month conflict. The Israelis have eased or
removed checkpoints along the main north-south road. I was there the day they
did it, and it was somewhat amazing. All Gaza seemed to be in motion by
whatever conveyance people could find, from donkey carts to Rollerblades to
luxury German sedan kind of racing up and down this road.

And in Bethlehem again the Israelis are gone from the center of town, but
they were less of a presence there and, as a result, people in Bethlehem feel
less of a difference; they're no more free to leave Bethlehem than they were
before the Israelis pulled back. In fact, they say that new checkpoints have
gone up; roads are even more tightly patrolled and blocked off than they were
before, so they still feel equally enclosed.

And it shows one of the problems, one of the pitfalls, really, of this plan,
because Palestinians in most of these West Bank towns, while they would like
to see the Israelis withdraw from the centers, what they most want to be able
to do is to travel freely within the West Bank, to also be able to travel
freely to Jerusalem again, to cross the limits of their towns. But the
Israelis say they can't afford to remove, essentially, their blockades around
these towns because of the risk of suicide bombing.

GROSS: Well, James Bennet, I want to thank you very much for talking with
us. Thank you.

Mr. BENNET: Thank you, Terry.

GROSS: James Bennet is the Jerusalem bureau chief for The New York Times.
He spoke to us from a studio in Jerusalem. Our interview was recorded earlier
today.

Coming up, rock critic Ken Tucker continues his series on the resurgence of
pop rock with the new CD, Bleu. This is FRESH AIR.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Review: Album "Redhead" by Bleu
TERRY GROSS, host:

As part of rock critic Ken Tucker's miniseries about the current resurgence of
pop rock, he's reviewing the new CD, Bleu, spelled the French way, B-L-E-U.
Bleu is the adopted name for William McAuley, a Boston-based musician who
alternately performs with a full back-up band or gives solo performances that
simulate the same effect via electronic samples, sound effects and tape loops.
Ken says that on Bleu's new album, called "Redhead," he uses a combination of
these two strategies to great effect.

(Soundbite of music)

BLEU: (Singing) We had a moment, we had a long talk, we had a few laughs. We
had a night off, we had a few drinks, we happened so fast. Before I noticed,
we had a sofa. I know, I know, I know, I know, we had a few fights. I didn't
see why we had to say bye. I'm doing fine. My friends all say so. I'm doing
all right. But that don't mean dick unless you know, I know, you know.

KEN TUCKER reporting:

Who's the nerviest wimp in current pop music? No, it's not "American Idol's"
Clay Aiken. It's William McAuley, who's Bleu in more ways than one. On
"Redhead," he's created a concept album about a guy who whines to, rages at
and peeps on a woman who obviously dumped him for doing all that stuff.
Embedded in lush melodies lonely with layered guitars and rich multitrack
vocals, Bleu's "Redhead" is a sustained meditation on romantic obsession.

(Soundbite of "Something's Gotta Give")

BLEU: (Singing) Since you left me, I've been almost fine, back to normal,
back to boring life. Drama's over since we dulled that shine. Saw your mom
at the mall just the other day buying you a brand-new bed. Said she missed
having me around, I could only die as I nodded my head. If you wanted me
back, I know I'd go and let you do it. If you wanted me back, I know somehow
we'd wander through it. If you wanted me back, I know I'd go, but someday
something's gotta give.

TUCKER: These are the protestations of a guy who doth protest too much. On
that song, "Something's Gotta Give," sung with an uncanny John Lennon-esque
edge in his voice, Bleu begins by saying that since his girl's left him, he's
feeling fine, quote, "back to normal." Then the creepiness begins to creep
in. The phrase `Drama's over since we dulled that shine' is a tip-off that
he's a guy who gets off on high-maintenance relationships. Then he runs into
his ex's mother at the mall, who tells him she misses having him around the
house. He's telling this to his ex-girlfriend using her own mother hoping to
instill guilt. Yeah, like that's gonna work as a strategy to get her back.

(Soundbite of music)

BLEU: (Singing) The streetlight winds through my cheap venetian blinds. The
hip-hop beats will not go to sleep. So I slip outside and go stalking in the
night, 'cause I don't know what to do about my life. So I'm watching you
sleep right outside your window, inches away from sleeping with you. And you
don't even know it, watching you sleep all night.

TUCKER: OK, now we're getting into the really disturbing stuff. Very pretty
song, isn't it? But the first verse has the line `So I slip outside and go
stalking in the night 'cause I don't know what to do with my life.' He says
he's, quote, "right outside your window, inches away from sleeping with you."
Time to get a restraining order, as long as Bleu can bring all his recording
equipment to keep making such music.

(Soundbite of "Somebody Else")

BLEU: (Singing) What if I was all right? What if I wasn't wound so tight?
What if I had the balls to be back? Would you still look at me like that?
Would you be mad that I had ...(unintelligible) you'll be back? Why can't I
be somebody else, somebody who isn't too good to believe it's OK to be like
me?

TUCKER: By the end of this album, Bleu is sublimating his frustration with a
rubber blow-up doll, until he's blue in the face and elsewhere. `What if I
wasn't wound so tight?' he muses miserably on "Somebody Else." Well, you may
have gotten the girl, Bleu, but you probably wouldn't have made this squirmily
gorgeous album.

GROSS: Ken Tucker is critic at large for Entertainment Weekly. He reviewed
the new CD "Redhead" by Bleu.

(Credits)

GROSS: I'm Terry Gross.

(Soundbite of music)

BLEU: (Singing) I was totally cool with the way things were going, wasn't
moving too fast, but my speed wasn't slowing. Ducks in a row, nice and easy.
I was fine with the fact that my heart wasn't showing. I was figuring half of
the battle is knowing that we can go down nice and easy. But then you let me
in your house and threw me on your yellow couch, you grabbed my head and then
you made me wonder when we'll do it all again, we'll do it all again, stumble
and fall, then do it all again. I was doing OK when we lived in the moment,
but a moment is only as long as you hold it. And when we let go...
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