Former President of South Africa, F.W. Deklerk.

Show: FRESH AIR
Date: JUNE 15, 1999
Time: 12:00
Tran: 061501np.217
Type: FEATURE
Head: F.W. DeKlerk Discusses the End of Apartheid in South Africa
Sect: News; International
Time: 12:06

TERRY GROSS, HOST: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

Tomorrow South African President Nelson Mandela steps down and Thabo Mbeki becomes the second president of post-apartheid South Africa. My guest F.W. DeKlerk was the president who presided over the dismantling of apartheid.

Six months after becoming president in 1990, in a startling address, he announced he was lifting the ban on the ANC, the African National Congress, and releasing Nelson Mandela from prison. Then he began negotiating a new constitution with Mandela and other black leaders.

DeKlerk and Mandela shared a Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. DeKlerk ran against Mandela for the presidency and lost. He served as deputy president until June 1996 and retired from politics in '97. Now DeKlerk has written an autobiography.

He was first elected to parliament in 1972, held six cabinet positions and was a leader of the National Party which created and upheld apartheid. I asked at point in his career he realized he wanted to end apartheid.

F.W. DEKLERK, FORMER PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA; AUTHOR, "F.W. DEKLERK: THE LAST TREK A NEW BEGINNING": I never had what one can call a "Damascus Road" experience. There wasn't one particular point where suddenly I got clarity in my mind. I, together with my colleagues in the National Party with my co-leaders, I've been a leader of one of our provinces since 1982, went through a whole process.

Reform really started tentatively when I entered parliament, not because I entered parliament but when I entered parliament in 1972-73. But it really picked up when we had a change of prime minister when P.W. Botha became prime minister in '78.

That year also coincided with me becoming part of the cabinet. And right from the beginning his message was we must look at fundamental reform. This led to a split in the National Party, the more conservative element breaking away early in 1982, and since then reform really started to roll.

First, we changed our constitution and brought what is referred to as the so-called "coloreds," people of mixed origin and Indians into the mainstream of politics. We then still believed that black political rights should be fully achieved through the route of independent states for the various black nations within South Africa.

But there was a cabinet committee, on which I served, which was called the Constitutional Reform Cabinet Committee, or something like that. And we worked at what should our final goal be. What can work in South Africa? How can we bring justice to all?

And it was becoming clearer and clearer that the old way in which we wanted to bring justice was simply just not working. The demographic realities was against it, the economic realities was against it, and the majority of black people for whom the solution of independent states and a confederation of states in southern African was intended, the majority rejected.

And this led to the National Party abandoning the policy of apartheid, abandoning the whole concept of separate development formally in August 1986. We then held an all-white election in May '87 and said give us a mandate for a new vision of one united South Africa with one citizenship; with one person, one vote; with all forms of discrimination to be abolished. But with the effective protection of the cultural and language rights of our many cultural minorities.

So if there was a real turning point where we formalized the abandonment of the concept of separate development it was August 1986.

GROSS: I'm wondering if you see your role in the ending of apartheid as being motivated by ethics or something much more practical than that.

DEKLERK: In this process, which I have just described there was really a strong element of taking a long hard look at ourselves. And in my personal motivation the quest for justice was the driving force.

So, it was much more ethical. I'm not saying that sanctions, that the growing isolation of South Africa, that the rising threat of terrorism didn't play a role, and did not influence maybe also the pace of things.

But the decision to change was an ethical decision, was acceptance that we, instead of having achieved justice, that we were actually continuing to keep alive a system which has become inherently unjust and morally unjustifiable. And therefore, we didn't try to just reform separate development, we abandoned it and made a 180 degree turn.

GROSS: When you were elected Nelson Mandela had already been holding secret talks with members of government and the minister of prisons, this is while he was in prison. Did you know about those talks when you became president?

DEKLERK: Yes. I became leader of my party on the 2nd of February 1989, and having been elected as leader of the party that really made me within the framework of the constitution and the political situation as it then was the president-elect. And immediately I was then fully briefed.

I did not know about it, I had a vague sort of suspicion that this was happening, but I was not part of P.W. Botha's inner circle. I was then immediately fully briefed, and since then I was kept abreast of all the developments until I became president and started issuing the orders.

GROSS: So what was your reaction when you found out about these secret talks?

DEKLERK: I welcomed it. The background was that I was supportive of other efforts of P.W. Botha to release Mandela. Mandela was offered twice to be released by P. W. Botha, my predecessor. The first time he was asked to sign an undertaking to go and live in what we regarded as an independent country -- the rest of the world did not recognize it - the Transky (ph). Mandela refused.

There was another effort where it was suggested that if Mandela signs a document in which he undertakes to -- not to participate in what they call the armed struggle. In which he basically rejects the armed struggle, in which he distances himself from political violence also by the ANC, he once again refused to do so.

So, everybody within the government and within the leadership of the National Party realized that Mandela has been in jail too long. That he has become an icon. That he has become a martyr in the eyes of the rest of the world. And also within the framework of our own penal system he was there too long. Life was at that stage regarded as about 20, 21 years.

And then murderers and the like who had life would often be released after 20 or 21 years, and he was then already there 25, 26 -- when I released him, 27 years.

GROSS: So are you saying that you thought he was doing you more harm than good by being imprisoned because of the potent symbol he had become, because he had become an icon?

DEKLERK: Yes, that's from one viewpoint. From another viewpoint, also he has paid his dues. He has served his sentence, and justice also required that he should be released.

GROSS: How did your first impressions of Nelson Mandela compare to what you expected?

DEKLERK: I was not surprised, or taken by surprise, in the sense that I was briefed about him, about his personality, about he conducted the other discussions in which he was involved with the minister of prisons, with senior officials and so on.

But when I met him physically, for instance, he was taller than I expected. He had, which he still has, an air of dignity around him. I found him a fairly impressive man. He had a firm handshake. We had a good discussion. We did not really discuss anything of substance. We were sort of testing each other, probing, in an effort to decide can we trust each other.

And both of us, he in his "Long Walk to Freedom" and I in my "Last Trek a New Beginning," said of each other that we felt we could do business, that there was an integrity on which we could we build.

GROSS: Given that you had a relationship of -- you had a kind of adversarial relationship with two people who would agree to work together, what was your feelings about Nelson Mandela as you accepted the Nobel Peace Prize together?

DEKLERK: Can I just say about the adversarial; it was mainly caused by Mandela's accusations that I was not doing enough to end the violence, to end the killing. In the end, he has now been president for five years. He's retiring within a few days, I think he has learned that a president can't just push a button.

That what happens at grassroots level is not within your direct control and that the real test is what to do to prevent this? What do you do to find the culprits if things are being done which should not be done by those under your command or under your authority?

When we stood there it was mixed feelings. I was glad that that which I stood was given the recognition. I did not regard myself as the individual who achieved that. I was receiving on behalf of the people that I represented in the negotiation situation and in initiating the fundamental transformation process.

I never had any doubts that he also deserved it. And I've never had any feelings of jealousy with regard to the wonderful recognition which he is getting, and which he was getting there alongside me.

GROSS: My guest is former South African President F. W. DeKlerk who presided over the ending of apartheid. He's written a new autobiography. We'll talk more after a break.

This is FRESH AIR.

BREAK

GROSS: My guest is F. W. DeKlerk, the former South African President we ended apartheid and received a Nobel Peace Prize with Nelson Mandela for ending it.

When you were looking into the future and trying to figure out what to do as president of South Africa, what were the alternatives you saw to ending apartheid? Say you didn't end it and tried to keep the system going, did you see revolution ahead? Did you see a bloody end to white rule? Did you see a failed economy for South Africa? What were the alternatives?

DEKLERK: I saw catastrophe looming. I saw that we would -- if we clung to power and if we just tinkered here and there with reforms that we would become more and more isolated. That the whole world would be united with the majority of all the people in South Africa behind one common goal, and that is to turn us on our head, to turn our country on its head.

I saw hundreds of thousands of people dying in that process. I saw the country's economy destroyed if we were to do that. And I really think there was no reasonable alternative to the one which we chose.

GROSS: I'm sure you opposed the sanctions against South Africa when you were in the government, but I'm wondering in retrospect if you think the sanctions were a real impetus to end apartheid. I'm thinking of economic sanctions and of, you know, isolating South African sports teams for instance. You used to be the head of sports and entertainment. So those boycotts really affected you in a very personal way.

DEKLERK: Yeah, but let me use it as an example. I, as a young minister, once had the Department of Sport falling under me. I was also the minister of sport. When I was minister of sport we changed our policy to one of total withdrawal, depoliticizing sport fully.

And we recognized the full autonomy of all sports organizations, and said that we would not prescribe to them in anyway whatsoever. They immediately abolished all racial discrimination in many sports. So, we complied with what the world wanted us to do in the field of sport.

Instead of rewarding us and saying, right, now you can play again, they continued with the sports sanction. This is a good example of how South Africans then felt; well, the sanctions are not really bona fide. And it won't help to make concessions because there is no reward if we make concessions.

What the world wants is not for us to reform, they want us to hand over power to what was then a communist supported organization which was fighting against everything that the West stood for. The ANC was supported fully by the USSR when it was still a world power.

Russia, there's no doubt about it, had an expansionist policy in the whole of southern Africa. There was a war in which we fought against many, many thousands of Cubans which were brought in with the financial support into southern Africa, into Angola, right on our borders.

So it was more complicated than sort of sanctions just because of apartheid, and we either changing apartheid or not. There was a complicated set of interactive factors. In the end, sanctions at times delayed reform because sanctions was used to mobilize white public opinion.

There was a great anti-American feeling at a certain stage. John Foster, in 1977, won the greatest victory ever of the National Party on the basis of an anti-American platform in the election campaign because of the sanctions. And because of the damage which it was doing, and because of what was regarded as unreasonable demands.

I, as a matter of principle, don't believe in sanctions. Not just in the South African situation. Sanctions should be reserved for extremely serious situations where engagement and discussion and other ways of influencing decisions clearly cannot succeed.

GROSS: Wasn't the situation in South Africa extremely serious? And hadn't attempts to end apartheid through discourse fail completely?

DEKLERK: No. No, because as I said earlier in our program, there was fundamental reforms already beginning in early '80s. Throughout the '80s there was a clear indication that we were on the path of fundamental reform.

GROSS: But I think a lot of...

DEKLERK: ... and I as a minister toured the world in my many portfolios that I've held. And so did my colleagues, and we explained this and we were listened to.

But nonetheless, the sanctions remained. We weren't given recognition and encouragement to reform. It was -- the stick remained, even though the indications were clear that apartheid was crumbling. That those in charge was themselves -- were themselves considering and busy breaking it down.

So what I'm saying is sanctions were kept for too long. Even after my speech of the 2nd of February 1990 we weren't immediately given full recognition. Still, the governments of the world didn't want to displease the ANC, and the ANC even after having been unbanned, with Mandela released, with everything in place for negotiations, insisted that sanctions should stay in place until, as they would have phrased it then, until they takeover power.

GROSS: Don't you think a lot of international leaders and many citizens around the world felt -- don't you think they felt that a reform system of apartheid wasn't good enough, only the end of apartheid was the appropriate solution?

DEKLERK: But since 1986 we made it clear -- since 1986 we made it clear that we're not going to reform apartheid, that we're going to abolish apartheid. I think they didn't believe us. I think we had to build -- upgrade ability. And this is one of the reasons why I made the speech on the 2nd of February in the way I did. That is why I put -- instead of doing things step-by-step I decided to, with one bold stroke, do almost every thing at once.

In order to impress on the rest of the world and on everybody concerned that we can be trusted on this, that we are not playing around or fooling around. But since '86, what we said to world leaders was there will no longer be apartheid, we are going to abolish it. We want to do it quickly but we need to do it in an orderly way so as to prevent chaos from taking over.

GROSS: F. W. DeKlerk has written a new autobiography. He'll be back in the second half of the show.

I'm Terry Gross and this is FRESH AIR.

BREAK

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

Back with former South African President F. W. DeKlerk, who presided over the end of apartheid. Six months after becoming president he released Nelson Mandela from prison. They shared a Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. DeKlerk was first elected to parliament in 1972, and became a leader of the National Party which created and upheld the apartheid system.

Did you ever have a change of heart morally about apartheid?

DEKLERK: Yes. But once again, it was...

GROSS: ... gradual?

DEKLERK: It was gradual. It was a process. I supported, with great idealism, separate development because I believed that the end goal which we had was morally justifiable. Namely to give full political rights to everybody living in South Africa but along the route of nation-states.

We have 11 official languages. South Africa is one of the most diverse societies in the world, and Zulu is as different from Sutu (ph) as French is from German. So, we still have that diversity.

And we wanted to build a little Europe there where the Zulus would have Zululand and the Kosars (ph) would have the Transky and the Sutus would have their country and the Tswana's their country and the Afrikaaners, the whites, would have their country.

And all those countries would corporate in something like a confederation with regard to their common interests. You know, this is the solution which the whole world today supports for Israel and Palestine. The basis of the separation which the world supports is ethnic, it's religious, and they say the solution is the establishment of a separate state.

GROSS: There are some real differences though.

DEKLERK: So that it was what I supported, but in the end that did not succeed. Although four of those countries did accept independence, the world refused to recognize that. The majority said yes, we will take powers but more or less equal to the powers that your states have within a federal system.

So, in the end, it led to morally unjustifiable discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, and that was and is morally unjustified.

GROSS: In terms of the ethnic separation in South Africa there's a difference between that and, say, the Israeli-Palestine situation. The blacks really had no say in the creation of apartheid. Blacks were thrown out of their homes and exiled to so-called homelands. And then were deprived of rights in the larger society. So it doesn't really seem like a comparable situation.

DEKLERK: Yeah, but you see it was quite different from how you describe. The homelands wasn't created by us, it's part of history. As Lesotho, which the British made independent, was the homeland of the Sutu's and still is.

But more than half of the Sutus work in South Africa, and they have family back in Lesotho. And they go back for holidays and they go back for weekends. And likewise, Botswana, which Great Britain made independent, more than half of its population is not living in Botswana; and likewise Swaziland.

So the old colonial borders in Africa really didn't always make sense. So we didn't create it and then said, now we've created an artificial homeland now all of you go back. We said, come and work here. We improved the housing. But exercise your basic political rights there.

Yes, choose your own mayor. Have your own structures for local government. But at the national level let us exercise our political rights through our main political basis, the countries where we rule ourselves as different peoples and as different nations.

It's like a Frenchman working in London but voting for the French government. That was the concept.

GROSS: But the practicality always included passbooks and police oppression. A kind of built-in poverty, since there were no economic options. You know, men having to travel to white towns -- to white cities to work but not being able to take their families with them. So families were divided.

DEKLERK: Well, that part is what led to the downfall of apartheid, the moral unjustified part. The pain that it caused, for that I have apologized. I have acknowledged the wrongness of that. We believed at the time that it would be temporary. That it would pass, that that was a necessary phase to achieve the goal.

In the end, it was perpetuated and it caused a lot of pain and a lot of suffering and a lot of loss of opportunity, and for that I have profusely and very strongly apologized in the clearest of terms. I'm not trying to justify that.

My book is about explaining what the thinking patterns were at different stages. We must remember that when the word apartheid was coined, apartheid was implemented in the United States. The colonies were still colonies. The colonial powers were still, I would almost say, raping Africa, without really being worried about political rights.

Then the winds of change, as former British Prime Minister MacMillan called it, blew through the whole world and also through Africa. The whole colonial system subsided. Also, here you had your problems in the abolishment of the separate but equal approach.

And we felt out of step in the late '50s and in the '60s with the rest of the world. And then from the middle '60s reform began and the realization that we were falling out of step began to dawn. And I think, yes, we clung too long.

The question is whether it was possible to do what I did, let's say in 1970 or in 1975 or even in 1980. Or would any leader who did what I did at that stage have been merely just rejected and replaced by another leader. That's an issue of speculation.

GROSS: My guest is former South African President F. W. DeKlerk, who presided over the ending of apartheid. He's written a new autobiography. We'll talk more after a break.

This is FRESH AIR.

BREAK

GROSS: F. W. DeKlerk is my guest, he's just written an autobiography about his life and about his role as the president of South Africa who ended apartheid and received a Nobel Peace Prize for it.

You come from a family of political leaders. Your great-grandfather, grandfather and father were all in government. And, you know, members of your family played a role in building and upholding the apartheid system. And I'm wondering looking back what you think of your family's participation.

DEKLERK: They weren't hard-line racists. They didn't hate anybody. They didn't want to suppress. They wanted to defend what was theirs, namely the right to self-determination. We fought a war in which 26,000 women and children died in concentration camps against Great Britain when they annexed the republics within which my forebears achieved full independence and political rights.

We drenched the soil of South Africa to fight for our political right. And that is what they wanted to defend, but they didn't want to defend it on the basis of not also granting it to others. They just wanted a system, this was the driving force, a system which would allow them to retain their self-determination while others achieve it alongside them.

And firmly believed that if they opened up the system on the basis of one man, one vote within the framework of the demographic realities being a minority vis-a-vis black South Africans, that they would then lose that right. This was what I was brought up with.

GROSS: Between the Goldstone Commission on the prevention of public violence and intimidation which examined human rights abuses under apartheid, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission a lot of injustices have come to the surface, especially a lot of police abuse. And I know that you've denied knowledge of most of these things until they were brought to the surface by these commissions.

But a lot of people have wondered how could you have not known being such an insider in government -- how could you have not known what so many outsiders suspected?

DEKLERK: Because there was no policy which authorized such atrocities. Because even the heads of the departments who were directly from a managerial point of view in charge, the chief of police, the head of the defense force also did not know.

They did not apply for amnesty. They, to this day, deny knowledge of these atrocities. They were the people who briefed me. There is -- let me use an example, there is police brutality throughout the world. You have recently had cases of police brutality.

GROSS: Absolutely.

DEKLERK: Is the president -- should he know about this? Should the mayor of New York know about this? Should the governor of the state know about this? Shouldn't the test be what do you do to prevent it? What are the rules to prevent it? What systems do you have in place to prevent it?

And if it nonetheless happens, what do you do to root it out and what do you do to punish those who are guilty?

GROSS: It just seems that...

DEKLERK: ... and that I describe in my book. That we had systems in place -- when somebody was killed and there was an allegation that there was a security force involved, there would be an investigation. Every violent death was followed by an inquest with a magistrate, with the police bringing whatever evidence is available; as in the states, as in England, as in any civil society.

There were rules in place. I strengthened the rules when I became president. I broke down the securocrat (ph) system. I reduced the big conglomerate which was around the so-called security -- state security -- counsel. I reduced it to three people.

I then stopped even convening the state security council. I appointed the Haram's (ph) Commission. When the Haram's Commission, to my mind, did not really penetrate and got to the bottom of the truth I appointed Goldstone. I didn't leave a stone unturned. And when there was evidence, police were charged in an open court.

In one case, which I clearly now remember, a policeman as a result of these investigations was found guilty of complicity in murder and was sentenced to death. I wasn't protecting it. I wasn't looking away and sort of just turning my back on this.

I was insisting that each and every allegation when there seems to be some credibility in it should be followed up and that it should be investigated properly and I empowered the police. At one stage I considered establishing a branch outside the police to do these investigations. We then finally settled on rather the Goldstone Commission.

GROSS: I understand what you're saying, but, you know, you were saying there were rules in place. But weren't those rules systematically violated by the police, and weren't some of the investigations more like cover-up's?

DEKLERK: Yes, I was worried about that. And I insisted in meetings -- it is described in Patty Waldmeyer's (ph) book about South Africa. I insisted -- I asked my ministers, are you sure that you're not being led up the garden path? I asked these heads of departments, do I have your absolute assurance?

I pushed. But more than that, in the -- in the change of policy there was and an element which did not agree with what we were doing in the political field. There was an element which regarded what I announced and what I was implementing as a catastrophe. There was an element who decided they would actively undermine my reform and transformation process.

Because they didn't want the new constitution as it is. They didn't want one man, one vote. They regarded -- I was called in some of the amnesty hearings a traitor by some of these people who committed these murders. So they were not on the point of sort of taking me into their confidence. They wanted to trip me up.

There was also that element.

GROSS: How is the new South Africa? How is living in the new South Africa different from life during apartheid?

DEKLERK: It's different, and it's not different. It's not different in the sense that everything is going on normally. The integration of residential areas has not caused any waves or problems. Integration at school level and at university is going fairly well. There are some incidents now and then, as you have some incidents now and then in your schools.

But generally speaking, it's going, in many fields, better than even the most conservative people expected. There is tremendous goodwill. It has always been there inherently, but it is blooming now. There is, generally speaking, good -- a good relationship between black and white and colored and Indian. The tension has gone.

And this was illustrated so clearly in the two elections that we've had where people stood together in queues waiting patiently for their chance to vote, chatting with each other. So, it's a much better place from many vantagepoints, but crime has risen. Unemployment has grown. We need more economic growth.

There's still a skepticism. The very world which said we must do what we do -- what we did -- is still withholding final judgment to the investors. Yes, they are there with short-term investments but we're not getting enough fixed and long-term investments. They want to see whether the new system will hold. Whether they will adhere -- the governing party will adhere to well-balanced economic policies.

So, we have tremendous challenges still, but at least we've made a good start. We have a good constitution. We have good rules in place. We must just make sure that it becomes a living document, our new Bill of Rights. And that our economy, through the establishment of confidence amongst investors that the system in South Africa will hold, will start growing in order to meet our unemployment problem.

GROSS: Of all the decisions you made along the way to ending apartheid is there any one decision that you're particularly proudest of?

DEKLERK: Let me first say I have no regrets about any of the major decisions that I've made, and I'm proudest of the package that I put together for the 2nd of February 1990. Because it succeeded to thaw the ice, it succeeded to establish credibility. It gave the process a kick-start without which maybe we would still be negotiating now and there would still be tension and conflict.

GROSS: And that includes the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC?

DEKLERK: Yes.

GROSS: And now that you're retired from politics how do you spend your time?

DEKLERK: Well, I spent the first year writing the book. It's hard work writing such a book, checking and rechecking and triple checking your facts. I have now registered, and I will be launching a foundation, it will be called the F. W. DeKlerk Foundation.

It will have as one of its main aims to act as a catalyst and together with others establish something like a center for peace and reconciliation in South Africa. Because in that regard the Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself says it did not achieve its goal of really successfully promoting fundamental reconciliation.

It will have as a focus to make our constitution a living document, to strengthen it and uphold it. It will have as a focus a totally nonparty political way to promote multiparty democracy. And it will have as a focus to mobilize our civil society the advantaged community in South Africa to really reach out effectively to the disadvantaged and to come onto the playing field in helping to achieve a better life for all.

GROSS: F. W. DeKlerk has written a new autobiography. Tomorrow Thabo Mbeki becomes the second president of post-apartheid South Africa.

This is FRESH AIR.

This is a rush transcript. This copy may not
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Dateline: Terry Gross, Washington, D.C.
Guest: F.W. DeKlerk
High: Former president of South Africa, F.W. DeKlerk. He dismantled apartheid, released Nelson Mandela from prison, and later shared a Nobel Peace Prize with Mandela. DeKlerk has a new autobiography, "F.W. DeKlerk: The Last Trek A New Beginning."
Spec: Africa; Human Rights; Lifestyle; Culture; F.W.DeKlerk

Please note, this is not the final feed of record
Copy: Content and programming copyright 1999 WHYY, Inc. All rights reserved. Transcribed by FDCH, Inc. under license from WHYY, Inc. Formatting copyright 1999 FDCH, Inc. All rights reserved. No quotes from the materials contained herein may be used in any media without attribution to WHYY, Inc. This transcript may not be reproduced in whole or in part without prior written permission.
End-Story: F.W. DeKlerk Discusses the End of Apartheid in South Africa

Show: FRESH AIR
Date: JUNE 15, 1999
Time: 12:00
Tran: 061502NP.217
Type: FEATURE
Head: Maureen Corrigan Reviews "Music for Torching," by A.M. Homes
Sect: Entertainment
Time: 12:50

TERRY GROSS, HOST: A.M. Homes has won critical acclaim for her story collection, "The Safety of Objects" as well as her novels, including "The End of Alice" and "In a Country of Mothers." Book critic Maureen Corrigan says her new novel, "Music for Torching" is a scorcher.

MAUREEN CORRIGAN, BOOK CRITIC: The most frequently asked question I get as a book reviewer is, "do you always read the whole book?" And I hold up my right hand and answer, "always, reviewer's code of honor."

A.M. Homes' new novel, "Music for Torching," provides an excellent example of why skipping any part of a book is dangerous, not to say unethical. Up until the last 25 pages of this novel I had one opinion of it, present tense edgy, engrossing, sometimes very funny but ultimately kind of, eh, pointless.

Then at the very end Homes' violently changes the texture of her novel, somehow without violating the integrity of her narrative. Those last pages possess the shocking unreal feel of real-life tragedy. And they made me go back and describe a grave meaning to a lot of what had previously seemed aimless in the novel.

"Music for Torching" takes place in Cheever-Updike land: Paul and Elaine are a middle-aged married couple living in Westchester with their two sons. Their friends, who they see regularly for parties where everybody drinks too much, are almost all married too.

Paul commutes to his advertising job in the city and has affairs. Elaine cooks lamb roasts and says things like, "I'm stuck. I'm totally stuck." Her pre-feminist mother responds by telling her, "you think you're supposed to have feelings about everything? You don't need to have so many feelings."

What sets Homes' characters apart from their suburban literary predecessors is the level of sadism they're willing to sink to in order to shake off their numbness. In the opening scene Paul makes a date with a woman who's a guest at a Saturday night dinner party he and Elaine are hosting. After everybody leaves he and Elaine engage in rough sex during which they both sob.

The next morning Paul shaves his head. Later on, he'll shave off all his body hair, get a groin tattoo and begin wearing women's lingerie. That's after he and Elaine deliberately set fire to their house with the barbecue grill and then take the kids out for dinner as they listen to sirens wailing in the distance. Just another Pleasant Valley Sunday.

Fortunately, Homes has a nice instinct about when to relieve all this noisy desperation with moments of black comedy so that empty, bored Paul and Elaine don't come off like split level ranch house dwelling parodies of Ingmar Bergman characters. Elaine has a divorced friend who's working on her Ph.D. in women's studies writing papers with titles like, "The Male Gaze as Displayed in Your Grocer's Dairy Case."

When she and Paul take refuge from their smoldering house with neighbors who've attained a Martha Stewart level of good living, they realize that their feelings of defectiveness are totally legitimate. Here's that shared epiphany which occurs around the neighbor's impeccable dinner table.

"Paul is no longer smiling. He and Elaine are staring down at their plates ashamed. At their house things don't go like this, nothing is easy. It's every man for himself, each hoarding what little he has. Each wanting his own. Each wanting something different. They wait for disappointment. They constantly accumulate proof of having been let down, misunderstood, unappreciated. They are a tense and bitter lot, and haven't even noticed it until now."

Still, a little ennui goes a long way. I got fed up with Paul and Elaine, their world-weariness and their wild attempts to relieve it. I wanted their lives to change. Then, Homes whipped up those last 25 pages that anticipate horrors we've recently seen and read about on the news.

And I recalled, along with Paul and Elaine, the terrible truth of the old saw: be careful what you wish for, it may come true.

GROSS: Maureen Corrigan teaches literature at Georgetown University. She reviewed "Music for Torching" by A.M. Homes.

I'm Terry Gross.

This is a rush transcript. This copy may not
be in its final form and may be updated.

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Dateline: Terry Gross, Washington, D.C.
Guest: Maureen Corrigan
High: Book critic Maureen Corrigan reviews "Music for Torching," the new novel by A.M. Homes.
Spec: Entertainment; Lifestyle; Culture; A.M. Homes; Maureen Corrigan

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End-Story: Maureen Corrigan Reviews "Music for Torching," by A.M. Homes
Transcripts are created on a rush deadline, and accuracy and availability may vary. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Please be aware that the authoritative record of Fresh Air interviews and reviews are the audio recordings of each segment.